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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PHIL L. HANSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State
of Utah,

Case No. 21024

Defendant and Respondent
)

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
R. refers to the record on appeal.

No transcript was made

and thus none is available for the appeal.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Is the county protected from prosecution and liability
by virtue of the governmental immunity statutes (63-30-1, et seq.),
particularly by 63-30-3, U.C.A?
2. Do the actions

of the county constitute inverse

condemnation, and if so, is appellant entitled to maintain an
action under Article I, Section 22, Constitution of the State of
Utah, under the principle of inverse condemnation, to recover for
damages and losses sustained as a result of the county's actions?
RELEVANT PRIMARY AUTHORITIES
1. Constitution of the State of Utah;

Article 1, Section 22:

"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation."

-2-

2.

63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended);

"Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter,
all governmental entitites are immune from suit for any
injury which results from the exercise of a governmental
function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved
medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical
training program conducted in either public or private
facilities.
"The management of flood waters and other natural
disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of
flood and storm systems by governmental entities are
considered to be governmental functions, and governmental
entities and their officers and employees are immune from
suit for any injury or damage resulting from those activities.
3. 63-30-10 (l)(a), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended):
11

(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act
or omission of an employee committed within the scope of
employment except if the injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, whether or not the
discretion is abused . . . ."
4. 78-34-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended):
Due to the length of this provision it is copied at the
end of this brief as Addendum "A".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(A) Nature of the case:
This is an appeal from two orders of dismissal dismissing
the two causes of action in plaintiff's Amended Complaint, granted
by the honorable Dean E. Conder, district judge, in the Third
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
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(B) Statement of Facts;
Plaintiff alleges that in May of 1984, and continuing
for some time thereafter, Salt Lake County was engaged in the
work of altering the stream bed of Big Cottonwood canyon, in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, as part of its flood control
program. (R.2).

During the course of that work the defendant,

by and through its employees and/or agents, entered upon real
property owned by plaintiff adjacent to, and including, the
stream bed in said canyon, which land is more fully described
in the original Complaint. (R. 2-3)
Among the improvements on plaintiff's land were a cabin,
fully furnished, landscaping, a paved driveway, steel automobile
and foot bridges, and reinforcement and improvement of the
stream bed and banks. (R. 3)
During the course of the modifications to the stream bed
by the defendant, its agents and/or employees destroyed and
removed the bridges, most of the landscaping, all of the stream bed
and bank improvements, and most of the driveway. (R.3) (The
defendant county has admitted removing the bridges (R.74-75),
but it is disputed that the removal was necessary for flood
control, and even it was, it is disputed as to whether or not
the county should be required to reimburse plaintiff for said
removal.)
It

is alleged in the Complaint (R.2) and the Amended

Complaint (R.64) that damages were sustained as a result of the
flood waters, which flooding was allegedly due to improper changes
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in the stream bed.

However, those damages were miniscule and

plaintiff Hansen no longer makes any claim for same and those
matters are not at issue in this appeal.
On or about January 25, 1985, a written "Notice of Claim"
(R.7), as amended by amendment dated March 11, 1985 (R. 10),
was served upon the county, pursuant to the provisions of
17-15-10, 63-30-11, and 63-30-13, Utah Code Annotated (1953
as amended),

(R.5)

On or about the 8th day of April, 19 85, the claim of the
plaintiff was denied by the county, per a letter of even date
(R.ll)
On May 14, 1985, plaintiff filed his Complaint (R.2)
against Salt Lake County for damages sustained, claiming that
the county was responsible for the intentional destruction of
plaintiff's landscaping, bridges, and other described improvements,
and alleging that the county had waived its immunity to suit
in this situation by virtue of the provisions of 63-30-10,
U.C.A. (1953 as amended).
Shortly thereafter an Amended Complaint (R.64) was filed,
wherein the allegations of the original Complaint constituted
the First Cause of Action, and a Second Cause of Action founded
upon the principle of inverse condemnation was added.

Both causes

of action were directed at obtaining relief for the same damages,
approaching the basis for relief from two different principles.
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Under two separate Motions to Dismiss (R. 12 and R. 72) the
county moved the court to dismiss the two causes of action of
plaintiff's Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted, alleging as to the cause of action
alleging that the county had waived its immunity to suit, that
such immunity had not been waived, and as to the second cause of
action, alleging that no right or claim can be founded upon
inverse condemnation under Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution
of the State of Utah.
The District Court, the honorable Dean E. Conder, presiding,
granted each motion

(R. 81 and R. 99), dismissing each cause

of action.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Three primary issues are involved in this action, to-wit:
1. It is the plaintiff's position that the county has waived
its immunity under 63-30-10, U.C.A.

Mr. Hansen does not seek

compensation for losses sustained as a result of flooding, in which
event the county would probably be immune.

However, he does seek

compensation for the substantial damages inflicted upon his land,
such as the destruction of the bridges, and other improvements
and landscaping.

It is plaintiff's position that Salt Lake County

is not immune in a situation where it causes the type of destruction
and damages as are involved in this case, whether intentionally,
or by neligence.
2. Paragraph two of 63-30-3, U.C.A., concerning itself with
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the management and control of flood waters, does not, in plaintiff's
opinion, exempt the county from responsibility for the damages
caused to the property of Mr. Hansen.

What constitutes the

management of flood waters, and in any event, did the legislature
intend to give governmental entities involved with flood control
a blank check in controlling the waters, resulting in the right
to take and/or destroy private property without any type of
compensation, and without any limits on the powers of the
government.

Further, if the legislature did so intend, is that

a constitutionally permitted action?
3. The third issue revolves around inverse condemnation,
founding a cause of action upon Article I, Section 22 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah.

Regardless of what the

foregoing immunity statutes may do, as far as providing immunity
to the county, the plaintiff submits that the taking of the
county is a taking without just compensation, resulting in the
plaintiff having a cause of action against the county for inverse
condemnation.

Does the principle of inverse condemantion operate

and exist in the state of Utah, and if so, does it afford the
plaintiff the relief he has requested in this action?
ARGUMENT
POINT I:
63-30-3 U.C.A. DOES NOT EXEMPT SALT LAKE COUNTY IN THIS ACTION
FROM LIABILITY TO THE PLAINTIFF
One of the county's primary contentions in the district court
below was that 63-30-3, U.C.A., paragraph two, exempts the county
from liability in this action, said paragraph stating as follows:
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"The management of flood waters and the construction,
repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by
governmental entities are considered to be governmental
functions, and governmental entitites and their officers
and employees are immune from suit for any injury or
damage resulting from those activities."
At the outset it is apparent that this particular code
provision presents a problem, to-wit:
"management of flood waters"?
vague in the extreme.

what constitutes

We submit that this provision is

In interpreting a statute it is the court's

primary responsibility to give effect to the intent of the
legislature.

American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P2d 1 (Utah, 1984)

Can it be said that the legislature intended to permit the
political bodies of the state of Utah to intentionally take and/or
destroy private property of the citizens of this state without
just compensation by the governmental entity, all in the name
of managing flood waters?

In certain cases the courts have

permitted governmental entities to engage in the work of flood
control with immunity from suit.

But the answer

to our foregoing

question must be answered in the negative as to the facts of this
particular case.
We believe that in this situation we are confronted with
a statute that is unconstitutionally vague and broad, incapable
of a consistent and equitable interpretation.

Therefore, the

statute should be held to be unconstitutional and thus inapplicable
as a form of relief to the defendant in this action.

This is in

keeping with the well known principle that "in general, due
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process of law in legislation requires certainty, clearness,
concreteness, and definiteness,and a vague or uncertain statute
does not meet the requirements of due process, as where it is so
vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all."
16C C.J.S. Sec. 974, p. 280.

It is also generally stated that

"the doctrine of constitutional overbreadth applies to statutes
or regulations that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
substantially impinge on constitutionally protected conduct
as well as conduct subject to governmental regulation."

Ibid.,

at p. 284.
While

it is required that the courts attempt to construe

statutes in such a way as to avoid an unconstitutional application,
we submit that the language of the second paragraph of 6 3-30-3 is
so broad and vague as to prohibit a proper application, it is
highly subject to abuse by the governmental authority, and it is
difficult, if not impossible for the courts to consistently carry
out the intent of the legislature since the wording is so broad
that the intent is not manifest in the statutory language.

Or,

if the intent is present, it exceeds the constitutional rights
of the government in this instance.
Even should this court find that the statutory provision
is not unconstitutionally vague and broad, the subject provision
does not protect defendant from liability in this action for
several reasons.

First, reason and common sense dictate that the

legislature did not intend to permit a governmental body of this
state to intentionally or wrecklessly take and/or damage private
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property without just compensation.

The county's actions in

this matter constitute, in addition to any cause of action that
may arise out of their actions as set forth in the Complaint, an
inverse condemnation and taking of property of the plaintiff.
(This issue is discussed infra.)

To adopt the defendant's

position in this case one would have to take the position
that a governmental body could take their equipment and destroy
private property without compensation, as long as such actions
were done in connection with the "management" of flood waters
or involving any type of flood threat.
Second, the actions taken by the county do not fall under
the scope of the cited code section for the following two reasons:
first, flood waters were not being managed.

The actions complained

of were conducted by defendant prior to the flooding period.
actual control of existing flooding waters was under way.
flooding occurred at a future date.

No

The

Second, the actions were not

taken or conducted in connection with the " . . . construction,
repair, and operation of flood and storm systems . . . " since
the Big Cottonwood stream bed is a naturally existing water
carrying system, and thus does not constitute a flood or storm
system as contemplated under the statute.
Finally , the county presented to the court below authorities
wherein the facts did not square with the facts of this action.
In the matter of Brakensiek v. Sandy City, et al., Civil No.
C-84-0564 (R.27) the facts were that the plaintiffs had been
injured because of ground and surface water problems from a flood
control pond that the governmental entity had permitted a
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contractor to construct.

In the matter of National Mfg. Co. v.

U.S., 210 F2d 263, the plaintiffs had sued the government for
damages allegedly incurred from erroneous flood and weather
reports.

In Coates v. U.S., 181 F2d 816, flooding downstream

occurred as a result of defendant's work on changin the course of
the Missouri River.

In U.S. v. Gregory, 300 F2d 11, the dreging

by the government of certain canals in the area of the property
owner's fish ponds caused those ponds to dry up because the ground
water level was reduced.

In U.S. v. Ure, 225 F2d 709, flooding

occurred as a result of a break in an irrigation supply canal
maintained by the government.

The list goes on and on, without

a single case involving a situation as we have here where the
court was confronted with a matter involving the taking of
private property for a governmental use.

We could find no fact

situations in any of the cases cited by the county to the district
court that even remotely coincide

with the facts of this action.

While the facts of these cases may apply to water damage caused to
plaintiff's property, they do not apply to the crux of this
plaintiff's claim, which is that the intentional or wreckless
acts of the county took and destroyed his privately owned property,
with no subsequent attempt to replace the property destroyed, or to
compensate the plaintiff for the taking.

While the county cited

a variety of authorities to the district court in support of
their argument, we fail to see any authority cited that applies
to the fact situation of this case and upon which the district
court was entitled to rely in making its decision.
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In summary, as to this point, it can be stated as follows:
First, the second paragraph of the cited code provision is
unconstitutionally vague and broad.

How can one determine what

constitutes a management of flood waters, and what limits are
to be placed upon the government in implementing the control of
any flood threat.
Second, even if the statute is constitutional, this court
has stated that the intent of the legisltaure must control.

We

have serious doubts that the legislature intended to override
the constitutionally protected rights of the citizens by the
enactment of this section.

In fact, in the matter of Utah State

Road Com'n. v. Friberg, 687 P2d 821, at 831 (Utah, 1984), this
court stated that in interpreting a statute the courts are
required to " . . . construe statutory terms to avoid an
unconstitutional application of the statute."

To construe this

statute as giving a shield to the county in this situation would
result in an application that would permit other takings of the
property without just compensation.
Third, the defendant cited no authority to the district
court where the facts squared with those of this action, and thus
there were no cogent authorities upon which to base a decision.
We do not have here damages due to flooding resulting from the
implementation of a basic program, but rather, the wanton and
intentional destruction of private property belonging to the
plaintiff.
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Fourth, the statute does not apply to this situation because
there is no actual management of flood waters owing to the
fact that no flooding was occurring, and further, there was no
injury resulting from the repair or operation of a flood or
storm system.
POINT II:
IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION IS WAIVED BY THIS DEFENDANT IN
THIS ACTION BY VIRTUE OF THE PROVISIONS OF 63-30-10 U.C.A.
In the countyfs argument to the district court it was
argued that the plaintiff is not entitled to bring his action
under 6 3-30-10 U.C.A. by virtue of the rather unique notion that
the plaintiff must name and sue an actual employee, rather than
the actual governmental entity itself. (R.21)

The court will

note that the statute itself states that "immunity from suit
of all governmental entities is waived . . .", then going on, but
waiving the immunity as to the governmental entity itself. [Emphasis
added]

We need not state at this time who the employees were, nor

are we required to put on proof as to the actual individuals
involved at this point in in the proceedings.

A governmental

entity must, by necessity, act through its employees.

It is not

a living organism that acts on its own volition, but rather, is
an entity created by law, consisting of its employees, and
functioning entirely through them.
It is the plaintifffs position that the damages he has
sustained were inflicted upon him by the intentional and/or
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negligent acts of the county.

Those acts, whether intentional

or negligent in nature, resulted in a taking of real property
and fixtures without just compensation.

We submit that

63-30-10 waives immunity in such a situation, and that the
district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's cause of action.
Defendant, however, argues that subsection (1) of the cited code
provision provides immunity to the county.

This section provides

as follows:
"Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent
act or omission of an employee committed within the scope
of his employment except if the injury:
(1) arises out of the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discrection
is abused. . . . "
In the case of Frank v. State of Utah, et al., 613 P2d
517, (Utah, 1980), the state of Utah endeavored to invoke the
defense of governmental immunity arising out of the acts or
omissions of an employee employed by a governmentally owned
health care facilityQ

In rejecting the state's claim or contention

of immunity this Supreme Court noted:
"In Carroll v. State Road Commission, this Court recognized
that almost all acts require some degree of discretion, and
observed that the exception to the waiver set forth in
the Act should be confined to those decisions and acts
occurring at the 'basic policy-making level,1 and not
extended to those acts and decisions taking place at the
operational level, or, in other words, ' . . . those which
concern routine, everyday matters, not requiring evaluation
of broad policy facts."
" . . . The exception to the statutory waiver here under
consideration, however, was intended to shield those
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governmental acts and decisions impacting on large numbers
of people in myriad of unforeseeable ways from individual
and class legal actions, the continual threat of which
would make public administration all but impossible• The
one-to-one dealings of physician and patient in no way
reflect this public policy-making posture, and should not
be given shelter under the Act. We therefore hold that
immunity is waived by operation of the Act, and that the
State of Utah may not escape liability by reason thereof."
While the defendant cited

various federal and other authoritiej

to the district court which attempted in a round-about way to
define the intent and scope of this code provision, we believe that
the Frank case, supra., provides excellent guidance for the court
in determining what constitutes a governmental discretionary act.
We submit that the acts involved in this case do not constitute
a discretionary act at the basic policy making level.

If

Mr. Hansen were complaining about damages caused by the flood
control efforts in general, then perhaps defendant would have
a point.

However, we believe that the facts in this case will

clearly show that the individual employees in this instance
interpreted the plan to modify the stream bed as giving them
the right to buldoze through private property, ripping and destroying
with impunity as they went.

This was never intended, I trust, even

at the policy making level.

Thus, it seems apparent that the

underlying policy had not been to take and destroy private
property without compensation or restoration, and this being the
case, immunity is waived in this instance.
On the other hand, even if the county's policy had been to
take without compensation, this would be contrary to constitution-
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ally protected rights of the plaintiff, and others so affected,
raising the issue of inverse condemnation.
The result of these arguments reveals two courses of
action available to the plaintiff, and which courses we believe
this court must validate.

The first is to determine that

6 3-30-3 is too vague, and perhaps, at the same time, too broad,
in its wording and impact, resulting in the act being unconstitutional.

This results in the loss of a shield for the county

under this provision.

This court should then determine that

immunity has been waived under 63-30-10, for the negligent and/
or intentional torts of the county.

Basically, we urge this court

to find that it was not the intent of the legislature to shield
the governmental entities of this state from situations where
private property is destroyed, and/or taken and converted to the
uses of such entities, that 63-30-3 was never intended as a
shield in such situations, and if it was, it violates the
constitutional guarantees provided under Article I, Section 22,
of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
The second course of action for the plaintiff is to seek
relief under the principle of inverse condemnation, discussed
hereinbelow.
POINT III:
THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO MAINTAIN AN ACTION AGAINST
SALT LAKE COUNTY UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF INVERSE
CONDEMNATION
In plaintiff's Amended Complaint (R.64) a second cause of
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action was filed wherein plaintiff makes his claim for damages
based upon the principle of inverse condemnation.

We submit

that a claim for damages and compensation based upon this
principle constitutes a valid claim against the sovereign and its
agencies, and that the district court committed error in granting
a motion to dismiss our action founded upon this basis.
This particular issue has been the subject of considerable
discussion in numerous cases dealt with by this Supreme Court.
At the very root of the issue of inverse condemnation lies the
constitutional safeguard and provision as set forth in Article I f
Section 22, of the Utah State Constitution, which provides that
"private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation." [Emphasis added]
In the case of State of Utah, by and through its Road
Commission v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 94 Ut. 384, 78 P2d
502, the court said:

"We think it is clear that the framers of

the Constitution did not intend to give the rights granted by
Section 22, and then leave the citizens powerless to enforce
such rights."
One of the principle issues presented by this constitutional
provision is whether or not the State, and its agencies and
political subdivisions, have impliedly granted consent to be sued
by adopting said constitutional provision.

Such construction and

rule was adopted in the case of Chick Springs Water Company v.
State Highway Department, 159 SC 481, 157 S.E. 842Q

See also
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the case of State v. Fourth Judicial District Courty supra,,
wherein this court ruled as follows:
"We think it is clear that the framers of the
Constitution did not intend to give the rights granted by
Section 22, and then leave the citizens powerless to
enforce such rights. We hold that this is so whether the
injury complained of by the plaintiffs in the injunction
suit is considered a 'taking' of property, or a 'damaging*
of property. The framers of the fundamental law, after
much debate and careful consideration of the hardship of
the old rule which allowed compensation only in the case
of a taking of property, wrote into the Constitution a
provision by which we think they intended to guarantee
to the landowner whose property is damaged just compensation
with the same certainty as to the landowner whose property
is physically taken."
There can be no question that the Constitution is recognized
as the supreme law of the land;
statutory enactments;

that it is paramount to all

and that the State Legislature has no

authority to enact laws contrary to constitutional provisions and
that the courts must enforce the constitutional safeguards with
or without legislative implementation.
A number of cases have recognized the rights of property
owners to seek redress for damages in cases similar to the subject
case.

See Great Northern Railway Company v. State, 173 P. 40

(Wash., 1918), and Rose v. State, 94 P2d 1053 (Cal.).

In the

case of Renniger v. State, 213 P2d 911 (Idaho)f the plaintiffs
instituted a suit against the state of Idaho for damages sustained
to their lands as a result of flooding created by the construction
of a bridge across a river and a change of grade in highway
construction.

In that case, the Supreme Court of Idaho rejected

the State's contention that it was not liable for the damages and
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noted as follows:
"It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result,
if in construing a provision of constitutional law, always
understood to have been adopted for protection and security
to the rights of the individual as against the government,
and which has received the commendation of jurists, statesmen and commentators as placing the just principles of the
common law on that subject beyond the power of ordinary
legislation to change or control them, it shall be held
that if the government refrains from the absolute conversion
of real property to the uses of the public it can destroy
its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent
injury to any extent; can, in effect, subject it to total
destruction without making any compensation, because in the
narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken for the public
use. Such a construction would pervert the constitutional
provision into a restriction upon the rights of the citizen,
as those rights stood at the common law, instead of the
government, and make it an authority for invasion of private
right under the pretext of the public good, which had no
warrant in the laws or practices of our ancestors."
In a more recent case, Walker v. Idaho Board of Highway
Directors, 524 P2d 169, (Idaho), the Supreme Court of Idaho once
again noted that "when real property was 'taken1 by the State without any compensation, such conduct results in a cause of action on
behalf of the landowner in 'inverse condemnation."

In the Walker

case, the Idaho court cites various authorities for the proposition
that where land has been "taken" by the sovereign without
instituting formal condemnation proceedings, a cause of action
exists against the sovereign under the constitutional authority
for damages based upon inverse condemnation.
Two of our sister states have recognized the right of
inverse condemnation where private property has been taken or
damaged for public use, recognizing the constitutional right to
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be compensated for private property taken for public use provided
the use is of a permanent or continuing nature.

In City of Yuma

v. Lattie, 572 P2d 108 (Ariz.), the Supreme Court of Arizona, in
recognizing a constitutional provision identical with that of
the State of Utah, noted:
"An examination of many authorities from various jurisdictions convinces us that the weight of authority in the
United States is to the effect that either the destruction
or the material impairment of the access easement of an
abutting property owner to [such] highway is compensable.
* * * * Our State Constitution . . . prohibits the taking
or damaging of private property for public use without
just compensation. It follows that the State can neither
take nor damage said easement of ingress or egress of an
abutting property owner without just compensation."
The court went on to note that in case of damage caused to
private property by the accumulation and sudden release of waters
thereby creating a flood which inundated the lands of the private
property owner was actionable and compensable under the theory
of inverse condemnation.

The court therein stating:

"This

action is one in inverse eminent domain, not negligence, and the
issues on that theory were properly raised and tried."
While it is immediately obvious that these authorities
give weight to the argument that the county in this action is
responsible for the small amount of flood damage, they, at the
same time give a clear indication that the county is liable for
the intentional taking and destruction of the plaintiff's private
property.

As noted in the authorities cited, the Constitution is

designed and created for the purpose of protecting the private
rights of the citizens against the sovereign, and to hold that
the sovereign must enact statutes to authorize proper redress
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for a violation of constitutional rights seems illogical and
contrary to the weight of authorities and better reasoned cases
on this subject.
CONCLUSION
For purposes of a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, it must be assumed
that the facts as stated in the Complaint and the Amended
Complaint are true.
demurrer.

Such a motion has the effect of a general

Given this situation we submit to this court that

the facts as pled by plaintiff constitute two valid claims under
the laws of this state.

The immunity of the county has been waived, and

the second paragraph of 63-30-3 does not afford the county a blank
check to do what they may with private property all in the name
of controlling flood waters.
Furthermore, it is clear that a right of inverse condemnation
exists under Article I, Section 22 of our constitution.

To uphold

the rulings of the district court, and to adopt the reasoning
of the county, one would have to conclude that a governmental
agency may rip through, destroy and take private property in the
course of any work connected with flood control.

One could even

carry it one step further and state that the county's position
is that it can take private property, or damage it, for any
purpose without paying just compensation as long as no formal
eminent domain proceedings had been commenced by it.

If this is

not the county's position then one can only conclude that a right
to inverse condemnation exists in the injured party.
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3. That this court rule that the county's immunity has been
waived under 63-30-10, U.C.A.
4. That this court rule that the county's immunity is not
maintained by virtue of 63-30-3, U.C.A,
5. That this court rule that the principle of inverse
condemnation is an appropriate remedy for relief for property
owners in this state, and in particular, for this plaintiff, and
further rule that the plaintiff has stated an adequate cause of
action to obtain such relief.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED:

\LL
'Attofneys for Plaintiff-Appellant

-23-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is *

....•,,.

ippL : -.a:

brief were ipail^:, LA^Laije prepaid, r.^ hrrue

T

ones, deputy

County Attorney, ittornpy for defendant, 2": I •
Lake C* -

:Yy^

4u0 OL .

day o: . -.ibruary,

ADDENDUM

UTAH CODE

Judicial Code
78-34-1
ms-im
administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary, 78-33-12. Chapter to be liberally construed.
creditor, devisee, legatee, heir, next of kin, or cestui
This chapter is declared to be remedial; its
que trust, in the administration of a trust, or of the purpose is t o settle and to afford relief from uncerestate of ft decedent, an infant, lunatic or insolvent, tainty and, insecurity with respect to rights, status
may have a declaration of rights or legal relations in and other legal relations; and is to be liberally
respect thereto:
construed and administered.
1953
(i) To ascertain any class of creditors, devisees,
79-33-13. "Person" defined.
legatees, heirs, next of kin or others; or,
T h e word "person" wherever used in this chapter,
(2) To direct the executors, administrators or
trustee*, to do or abstain from doing any particular shall be construed t o mean any person, partnership,
joint stock company, "unincorporated association or
»actta theirfiduciarycapadty; or,
(3)t^deterinine any • question arising in the ad- society, or municipal or other corporation o f any
1953
the esute or^tntst^iinchidint character whatsoever.
of1 construction of^wffls^tnd* other
writh**
im Chapter 34. Eminent Domain
71-33-5. E u n e r a t k H ^ i a precedlag jections no rest n c i w a # • couwt a general powers*
T l * f enumeration in -sections 78-33-2, 78-33-3
and 7*-334.does n o t limit or restrict,the exercise of
the general powers •conferred i n section 78-31-1 jn
any peocfrding where declaratory relief i s sought, in
which M judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty.
1953
7943-f. Discretion t o deny declaratory relief.
H i e court may refuse t o render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or
decree, i f rendered or entered, would not terminate
the uncertainty, or controversy giving,rise to the
proceeding.
1953
7133-7. Appeals and reviews.
AH orders, judgments a n d decrees under this
chapter may be reviewed as other orders, judgments
and decrees.
1953
7*33*. Snppitsifaial nsflef.
Further relief based o n a^dedaratory judgment or
decree may b e granted , whenever necessary or
proper. The application therefor shall be by petition
to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If
(he application is deemed sufficient, the court shall,
on reasonable notice, require any adverse party,
whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judgment or decree, t o show cause why further
relief should not be granted forthwith.
1953

(

79-34-1, Uies for wnka rig** may be exercised.
71-34-2. Estates ami rights taat may be takes.
79-343. Private property which may be taken.
7 9 4 4 4 . .Condition*, precedent to taking.
79-34-5. Right of entry for survey and location.
79-344. Complaint - Contents.
79-34-7, Whtf may appear and defend.
79-34-9;< Power* of court or fudge.
79-34-9. Occupancy of premises pending action - Deposit
paid into court * Procedure for payment of compensation.
79-34-10. Compensation and damages - How assessed.
79-34-11. When right to damages deemed to have accrued.
79-34*12. When title sought found defective - Another
action allowed.
79-34-13. Payment of award - Bond from railroad to
secure fencing.
79-34*14.- Execution for - Annulment of proceedings on
failure to pay.
79-34-15. Jadgment of condemnation - Recordation Effect.
79-34-16. Occupancy of premises pending action,- Substitution of bond for*deposit paid into court • Abandonment of action by condemner.
79-34-17. Rights of cities and towns not affected.
79-34-19. When right of way acquired - Duty of parry
acquiring.
79-34-19. Action to set aside condemnation for failure to
commence or complete construction within reasonable
time.
79-34-20* Sale of property obtained by eminent domain

79-34*1. Uses for which right may be exercised.
Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right
of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of
71-33-9. Trial © t tones of fact.
When a proceeding under this chapter involves the following public uses:
(1) All public uses authorized #by the government
the determination o f an issue o f fact, such issue
may be tried and determined in the same manner as of the United States.
(2) Public buildings and grounds for the use of
issues o f fact are tried and determined in other civil
actions in the court in which the proceeding is the state, and all other public uses authorized by the
pending.
1953 legislature.
(3) Public buildings and grounds for the use of
79-33-19. Costs.
any county, city or incorporated town, or board of
In any proceeding under thi* chapter, the court, education; reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes,
may make such award o f costs as may seem ditches, or pipes for conducting water for the use of
equitable and just.
1953 the inhabitants'of any county,or city or incorporated town, or for the draining o f any county, city or
79-&41>»afte.
incorporated ? town; the raising* of the banks of
When declaratory relief is sought aUbpersdhst shall
streams, removing u obstructions therefrom, and
be made parties w h o have or claim any interest
vhkh would be a f f e c t s by the declaration! and n o widening, deepening or straightening their channels;
roads, streets and alleys; and all other public uses
declaration shall prejudice the rights o f persons not
for the benefit of any county, city or incorporated
parties t o the proceecLing. In any proceeding which
town, or the inhabitants thereof.
involve* the validity o f a municipals or county
(4) Wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, f e m e s ,
ordinance or franchise such municipality or county
shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be bridges, toll roads, byroads, plank and turnpike
heard, and if a statute or state franchise or permit r o a d s / roads for transportation by traction engines
a alleged to be invalid the attorney general shall be or road locomotives, roads for logging or lumbenng
purposes, and railroads and street railways for
served with a copy o f the proceeding and b e entitled
to be heard.
i9S3 public transportation.
^(5) Reservoirs, dams, watergates, canals, ditches,

78-34-1

Judich

flumes, tunnels, aqueducts and pirjei^bf^the
supplying of persons, mines, mills', amelterfror^other
works for the reduction of ores,- with f water for
domestic or other uses, or for irrigation purposes,
or for the draining and reclaiming of lands, or for
the floating of logs and lumber on streams not navigable, or for solar evaporation ponds and other
facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution. ; %•
(6) Roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, .ditches,
flumes, pipes and dumping places to facilitate the
milling, smelting or other reduction of? ores, ^ot "the
working of mines, quarries, coal mines or. mineral
deposits including minerals in solution; outlets,
natural or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct; of
tailings, refuse or water from mills, smelters or
other works for the reduction of ores, of* from
mines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits
inducting minerals in solution; mill dams; gas, oil or
coal pipelines, tanks or reservoirs, including any
subsurface stratum or formation in any land for the
underground storage of natural gas, and in connection therewith such other interests in property Tas
may be required adequately to examine, prepare,
maintain, and operate such underground natural gas
storage facilities; and solar evaporation ponds*and
other facilities for, the recovery of minerals' in
solution; also any occupancy in common by the
owners or possessors of different mines, .quarries,
coal mines, mineral deposits, mills, smelters, or
other places for the reduction of ores, or any place
for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse
matter.
(7) Byroads leading from hign*ays to residences
and farms.
(8) Telegraph, telephone; electric light and electric
power'lines, and sites for electric light and power
plants.
(9) Sewerage of any city or town, or of any settlement of not less than ten families, or of any public
building belonging to the state, nr of anv college or
university.
(10) Canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes,
aqueducts and pipes for supplying and storing water
for the operation of machinery for the purpose of
generating and transmitting electricity for power,
light or heat.
(11) Cemeteries and public parks.
(12) Pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any
and all liquids connected with the manufacture of
beet sugar.
(13) Sites for mills, smelters or otner works tor
the reduction of ores and necessary to the successful
operation thereof, including the right to take lands
for the discharge and natural distribution of smoke,
fumes and dust therefrom, produced by the
operation of such works; provided, that the powers
granted by this subdivision shall not be exercised in
any county where the population exceeds twenty
thousand, or within one mile of the limits of any
city or incorporated town; nor unless the proposed
condemner has the right to operate by purchase,
option to purchase or easement, at least seventyfive percent in value of land acreage owned by
persons or corporations situated within a radius of
four miles from the mill, smelter or othdr works for
the reduction of ores; nor beyond the limits of said
four-mile radius; nor as to lands covered by contracts/easements or agreements existing between the
condemner and the owner of land within said limit
and providing for the operation of such mill,
smelter or other works for the reduction of ores;
nor until an action shall have been commenced to
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78-34-3. Private property wok
The private property whicl
this chapter indudes?*~
:^^*g&|
(I)'A11 real propertybdongmjfto M$fy8kaL$
• (2) 'Lands belonging* to* the * state, or to
county, city or incorporated1 town, not aporootiatdf
to some public use.
(3) Property appropriated to pun
that such property shall not be taken unless fori
more necessary public use than that to which it fc&
been already appropriated.
/^Aff persons in o<
(4) Franchises for toll roads, toil bridges, ferric'
~'n$ an interest
and all other franchises; provided, that such frasa
ed in the corni
hises shall not.be taken unless for free highways,
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and defend, <
: (5) All • rights of way for any and all' purpose
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of the state, or has i
(1) That the use to which it is to be apolicd h ;,
^ioa; otherwise by set
use authorized by law;
toe clerk of the co
(2) That the taking is necessary to such .use, .
pfarntiff to occupy
(3) That*construction and u$c>ol+M <prc
sought to be condemned will commcoce^witL „
to do such work t
reasonable time as determined by the courts after
court or a judge
the initiation of proceedings under this chapter; and
tvit or otherwise t
(4) If already appropriated^ some publicuae;
t o be condemns
that the public use to which it is to be annli«d is a
accrue front the
more necessary public u s c ^ , f<t&at*-.
m
for requiring a:
or refuse the ma
78-34-5. Right of entry for survey and locatioa.
the case and the n
In all cases where land is required for public
to die parties. Ii
the person/' or IBs agent, in charge of such use mat
or judge shall a
survey and locate the same; but it must be located
as a condition
in the manner which will be most compatible whs
with the derk of th
the greatest public good and the least private injury,
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS.

CODE-CO
Pro«tt,lM

Ft

